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ABSTRACT: Scientific realists use the “no miracle argument” to show that the empirical and 
pragmatic success of science is an indicator of the ability of scientific theories to give true or 
truthlike representations of unobservable reality. While antirealists define scientific progress in 
terms of empirical success or practical problem-solving, realists characterize progress by using 
some truth-related criteria. This paper defends the definition of scientific progress as increasing 
truthlikeness or verisimilitude. Antirealists have tried to rebut realism with the “pessimistic 
metainduction”, but critical realists turn this argument into an optimistic view about progressive 
science.         
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1. Varieties of Scientific Realism 
 
Scientific realism as a philosophical position has (i) ontological, (ii) semantical, (iii) 
epistemological, (iv) theoretical, and (v) methodological aspects (see Niiniluoto 1999a; Psillos 
1999). It holds that (i) at least part of reality is ontologically independent of human mind and 
culture. It takes (ii) truth to involve a non-epistemic relation between language and reality. It claims 
that (iii) knowledge about mind-independent (as well as mind-dependent) reality is possible, and 
that (iv) the best and deepest part of such knowledge is provided by empirically testable scientific 
theories. An important aim of science is (v) to find true and informative theories which postulate 
non-observable entities and laws to explain observable phenomena. 
 Scientific realism became a tenable stance in the philosophy of science in the 1950s as an 
alternative to empiricist views which reduced theories to the observational language (Ernst Mach’s 
positivism) or restricted scientific knowledge to the level of observational statements by denying 
that theoretical statements have truth values (Pierre Duhem’s instrumentalism). Critical scientific 
realism can be distinguished from naïve or metaphysical forms of realism by two additional theses: 
(vi) fallibilism and (vii) conceptual pluralism. 
 According to the principle of fallibilism, all factual human knowledge is uncertain or 
corrigible. This thesis was formulated by Charles S. Peirce in the late 19th century by arguing that 
science “approaches to the truth” with its “self-corrective method” (CP 5.575). John Dewey’s 
pragmatism developed fallibilism with an epistemic concept of truth as warranted assertability (see 
also Sellars, 1968, and Putnam, 1981), while critical realists have combined fallibilism with the 
semantical thesis (ii) by adopting Alfred Tarski’s model-theoretical explication of the 
correspondence theory of truth. Thus, against semantical antirealists like Michael Dummett, a 
scientific realist accepts that there are unknown and even recognition-transcendent truths about the 
world. The task of science is to apply and improve critical methods for solving cognitive problems 
about such so far unknown truths. The progress of science as such a theoretical enterprise is tested 
by its empirical success, since for a realist the best explanation of the empirical success of theories 
is the assumption that they are true or truthlike (see Section 3). 
 Some realists are extremely cautious fallibilists who take truth to be a regulative ideal or aim 
of scientific inquiry. Thus, realism has been defined by the weak condition that theories are possibly 
true (Mäki, 2002). Probabilistic versions of fallibilism take theories to be probable (or probably 
true) on the basis of observable evidence, where epistemic probability measures degrees of belief 
(certainty and uncertainty). Susan Haack’s (2007) “innocent realism” avoids exaggerated claims 
about the achievements of inquiry: while science is increasingly successful empirically and 
theoretically, we cannot claim that all scientific theories are true. Stathis Psillos (1999) formulates 
his epistemic thesis so that “mature and predictively successful scientific theories are well-
confirmed and approximately true of the world”. In Section 4, we shall return to the question about 
the epistemic status of successful theories.  
 Strong forms of fallibilism are ready to assert that typically theories are false, even 
known to be false, since they contain approximations and idealizations, but still one hypothetical 
(even false) theory may be “closer to the truth” than another theory. Karl Popper (1963) tried to 
define this key idea of fallibilism with his notion of truthlikeness or verisimilitude. By the same 
token, it is meaningful to state that a sequence of theories “approaches to the truth”, even when the 
final limit is not reached. Since 1974, after the failure of Popper’s attempt, a number of alternative 
and still debated precise definitions of truthlikeness have been given (see Oddie, 1986, 2014; 
Niiniluoto, 1987, 2007; Kuipers, 2000; Schurz and Weingartner, 2010). Here the logical or 
objective notion of truthlikeness tells how close a theory H is to a target C*, which is the complete 
truth about the world as far as it can expressed in a given conceptual framework L. The degree of 
truthlikeness Tr(H,C*) of H is maximal if and only if H is equivalent to the complete truth C*.i  
(1) Tr(H,C*) is maximal if and only if H = C*. 
This degree can be high even when H is false. A theory can be said to be truthlike if its degree of 
truthlikeness is sufficiently large – at least more truthlike than the weakest truth or a tautology. 
Most explications allow that some informative false theories may be truthlike in this sense. The 
relevant language L can be chosen in a flexible way, so that the alternative targets C* may include 
singular statements about individual objects, qualitative predicates, quantities, existence claims, 
generalizations, and laws. In the special case where C* includes only laws, verisimilitude is often 
called legisimilitude. 
The epistemic notion of truthlikeness tells how close we can estimate theory H to be to the 
target C*, given our background knowledge and available evidence E. Niiniluoto’s (1987) solution 
to the epistemic problem assumes that a rational probability measure P is defined for the language 
L, so that the posterior epistemic probability P(Ci/E) given evidence E is defined for each 
constituent (complete theory) Ci in L. Then the unknown degree of truthlikeness Tr(H,C*) may be 
estimated by its expected value relative to the constituents Ci and their posterior probabilities given 
evidence E:  
(2)   ver(H/E) = ∑ P(Ci /E) Tr(H,Ci) 
where the sum goes over all constituents of L.ii It is important that ver(H/E) may be high even when 
P(H) = 0 or P(H/E) = 0.  
  Some realists like Psillos (1999) suggest that formal issues concerning approximate truth and 
truthlikeness are not needed, if the operative notions are intuitively clear and do not lead to 
paradoxes, but this does not answer Larry Laudan’s (1984) claim that talk of verisimilitude is “so 
much mumbo jumbo”. We shall see in Section 2 that this notion helps the scientific realist to define 
scientific progress as theory-change with increasing truthlikeness (see Niiniluoto 1984, 2014). 
 Another key idea of critical realism is conceptual pluralism. All inquiry is relative to some 
conceptual framework which is used by the scientists for describing reality. This is what Immanuel 
Kant argued in his critical philosophy, but Kant thought that we are prisons of our native forms of 
sensibility and understanding. Critical realists instead argue that such conceptual frameworks can be 
changed, revised, and enriched. Already William Whewell argued that scientific languages should 
be chosen so that they enable us to formulate informative true general statements or laws (see 
Whewell, 1840, p. 509). If a language lacks expressive power, we can always add new terms to its 
vocabulary. This idea was developed by Peirce in his semiotics or general theory of signs. Such 
dynamic conceptual change is an important feature of the progress of science.  
 Conceptual pluralists go further in claiming that the world can be categorized in alternative 
ways with different conceptual frameworks. This idea is emphasized by Putnam’s (1981) internal 
realism, while metaphysical realism accepts a “ready-made world”. Psillos (1999) formulates his 
metaphysical thesis by stating that “the world has a definite and mind-independent structure”. He 
further argues that if objects and structures are constituted by conceptual schemes, this leads to 
“constructivist antirealism” or “perspectival relativism with epistemic truth”, where the objective 
world is either lost or reduced to “a noumenal blob without any resistance to our 
conceptualizations” (Psillos, 2009). Here he agrees with Putnam’s inference that the rejection of 
metaphysical realism would lead to an epistemic notion of truth (as ideal acceptability). However, 
against Putnam, critical realists have combined conceptual pluralism with the correspondence 
theory of truth (see Niiniluoto, 1984, 1999a; Tambolo, 2014). The basic idea is that THE WORLD 
is mind-independent, but it has a conceptualization WL for each semantically determinate language 
L. Here WL is an L-structure, in the sense of model theory, which represents THE WORLD as far it 
can be described in L. Thus, the truth of sentences of L in WL is well-defined by Tarski’s semantic 
theory. Conceptual pluralism now means that we need not accept with Sellars (1968) the existence 
of an ideally adequate “Peirceish” conceptual framework, i.e. there is no language L such that THE 
WORLD is an L-structure. Each language L has its own truths, but still truth is objective in the 
sense that we are free to choose the language L (with its vocabulary and interpretation), but THE 
WORLD decides the extensions of the L-terms and the truth values of L-sentences. Further, truth is 
not relative, since the truths about different L-worlds are all determined by the same WORLD and 
therefore cannot be incompatible with each other (see Niiniluoto, 2014c).iii 
 Also Philip Kitcher has moved from his earlier “monism” (i.e. the world has a unique 
structure which can be represented in a complete theory) to “modest realism” which combines truth 
as correspondence with conceptual relativity (see Kitcher, 1993, 2001; Diéguez, 2011). Kitcher 
states that our conceptual frameworks “draw new boundaries in nature”, but defends - against 
doubts raised by Helen Longino - the compatibility of truths in different languages.  
 Scientific realists have traditionally assumed, against instrumentalists, that all scientific 
statements have truth values (Niiniluoto, 1999a). Later developments include versions which 
restrict truth claims to existential postulates (Hacking’s and Cartwright’s entity realism) or universal 
and probabilistic laws (Worrall’s structural realism). We shall indicate below some problems in 
these half-realist positions: the determination of theoretical ontology involves the laws of the 
theory, and it is quite typical to modify the laws of a theory in order to find more truthlike ones. 
Chakravartty’s (2009) semirealism agrees with entity realism by including objects in its ontology, 
but restricts structural features to “detectable properties”. Also other versions of selective realism 
have been proposed as responses to antirealist arguments, but it is not always clear whether their 
restrictions of are meant as semantic (the excluded statements lack truth values) or epistemic (the 
excluded statements lack evidential commitment). Kitcher’s (1993) distinction between “idle” 
(presuppositional) and “working posits”, as well as Psillos’s (1999) strategy of “divide et impera”, 
can be understood in the latter sense, since they try to express what part of a theory is responsible 
for its empirical success and thereby gains epistemic support. 
 Ontological interpretation of selective realism is also advocated by ontic structural realism, 
which asserts that only the structure of the world is real (see da Costa and French, 2002). Such 
structure is expressed by relations and laws, so that objects and qualities are dispensed (or in some 
way constituted by structural features). This is a variety of metaphysical realism, as it assumes a 
unique structure of the world.iv   
 
2. Theories of Scientific Progress      
   
Since the 1950s philosophers of science have proposed various accounts of theory change.v 
Reconstructions of actual developments in science include, among others, reduction relations, 
theory evolution, scientific revolutions, and research programs. These studies are important, since a 
philosophical theory of scientific progress should be able show that major historical examples of 
scientific advancement have been progressive. However, accounts of theory change do not 
necessarily tell about scientific progress, since ‘progress’ is an axiological or a normative concept 
which should be distinguished from neutral descriptive terms like ‘change’ and ‘development’ (see 
Niiniluoto, 2015). To say that step from stage A to stage B constitutes progress means that B is an 
improvement of A or better than A relative to some standards or criteria. In particular, the notion of 
scientific progress should reflect the aims of good science. Fallibilist realists should not claim that 
all actual changes of scientific theories have been progressive. Temporary regress is also a 
possibility,vi even though the self-corrective method of science attempts to guarantee that theory 
change typically is improvement.  
 The most traditional model of scientific progress, shared by many rationalists and 
empiricists, is accumulation of knowledge. This view is associated with infallibilist epistemology 
which assumes that science can establish certified truths so that there is later no need to reject or 
correct them. Today most philosophers think that this kind of epistemology is outdated, and the 
cumulative model of progress is refuted by radical changes in the history of science. In the early 
modern science, Ptolemy’s geocentric astronomy was overthrown in the Copernican revolution, and 
the medieval impetus theories were replaced by the new mechanics of Galileo. For two centuries 
Newton’s mechanics was the most celebrated achievement of science, which was held to be true by 
most members of the scientific community, but still it was replaced by relativity theory and 
quantum theory in the early 20th century. Instead of accumulation, these new theories correct the 
earlier one by including it at best as a counterfactual special case. So according to the “principle of 
correspondence”, a new theory contains the old one approximately (Popper, 1979, p. 202).  
Something similar happens even in paradigmatic examples of cumulative growth: when Newton’s 
theory unified the empirical laws of Galileo and Kepler, as Whewell (1840) rejoiced in his notion of 
“consilience of inductions”, it explained these laws only approximatively. In radical theory changes, 
such as the transition from phlogiston theory to oxygen theory, the postulated theoretical entities of 
the old theory are overthrown and replaced by different kinds of entities.    
Critical realists, who wish to claim that science makes theoretical progress on the 
level of theories, have proposed an alternative to the cumulative view: by taking seriously the 
Peircean idea that science approximates the truth at least in the long run, Popper (1963) 
characterized scientific progress as increasing truthlikeness. His proposal was immediately rejected 
by Thomas Kuhn, who asked whether it really helps “to imagine that there is some one full, 
objective, true account of nature” so that “the proper measure of scientific advancement is the 
extent to which it brings us closer to that ultimate goal” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 171). Kuhn is right that 
“evolution-from-what-we-know” is easier to assess than “evolution-toward-what-we-wish-to-know” 
– this is, indeed, one of the virtues of the old cumulative model of progress. How could we define 
progress by approach to some unknown and perhaps infinitely complex destination? By analogy, 
sequences of natural numbers may approach the infinite number ω as their ideal limit, but any two 
finite natural numbers m and n are still infinitely distant from this limit (since ω – m = ω – n = ω). 
But it makes sense to say that m is closer to ω than n if and only if, for some natural number k ≥ m 
and k ≥ n, m is closer to k than n. Similarly, following the basic idea of conceptual pluralism, 
theories H and H’ may be compared for their truthlikeness relative to the target C*, where C* is the 
complete truth in a conceptual framework which includes both H and H’. In this sense, definition of 
progress by comparative truthlikeness does not presuppose that we are able to measure the distance 
of theories from some ideal “Peirceish” goal. This is enough to show that the idea of progress as 
increasing truthlikeness makes sense without any questionable metaphysical assumptions (see 
Niiniluoto, 1984).vii 
Given the distinction between objective truthlikeness Tr(H,C*) and its estimate ver(H/E), a 
similar distinction has to be made concerning the notion of progress: one should distinguish real 
progress, which need not be recognized by us insofar as the target C* is unknown, and estimated 
progress, which is accessible to our judgment on the basis of available evidence. So let us say that  
 
(3) step from theory H to theory H’ is progressive iff Tr(H,C*) < Tr(H’,C*)      
 
(4) step from theory H to theory H’ seems progressive on evidence E iff ver(H/E) < ver(H’/E). 
 
According to definition (3), objective truthlikeness Tr gives an ahistorical standard for telling how 
close we really are from the target C*, even when we don’t know it, and likewise a standard of real 
progress in science. According to definition (4), estimated verisimilitude ver expresses our 
judgments about progress, sensitive to historically changing situations with variable evidence. In 
contrast, decrease of objective or estimated truthlikeness is a mark of regressive development in 
science.  
Piscopo and Birattari (2010) complain that estimates of verisimilitude by ver(H/E) are 
not objective, as they depend on evidence E and can be revised with increasing evidence. But, even 
though a critical realist admits objective concepts of truth and truthlikeness (i.e., Tr), for a fallibilist 
all claims about the truthlikeness of theories and likewise claims about real scientific progress have 
to be based on some evidence – and they are equally conjectural as claims about truth. Even when 
ver(H/E) is high, our claim that H is really truthlike may be mistaken. The strongest sense of 
objectivity which can be demanded of a fallible measure like ver is that, on some conditions about 
appropriate and increasing evidence E, the value of ver(H/E) approaches the correct value Tr(H,C*) 
relative to the true target C* (see Niiniluoto, 2007).        
 In axiological terms, definition (3) expresses the view that the primary aim of science 
is informative truth: science is a truth-seeking and falsity-avoiding activity, whose success is 
measured by the truthlikeness of its best theories. At least when the target C* is expressed in a 
sufficiently rich conceptual framework, this primary aim guarantees that the best theories also have 
explanatory and predictive power.viii For applied science, the secondary aims could include such 
virtues as simplicity, manageability, and social relevance.    
 Examples of general results concerning the notion of scientific progress include the 
following kinds of theory change: 
 
(5) (a) from ignorance H v ¬ H to true H 
(b) from ignorance H v ¬ H to sufficiently truthlike H 
(c) from a true theory to a logically stronger true theory 
(d) from a false theory H to its truth content H v C* 
(e) from a false theory to a sufficiently informative true theory 
(f) from a false theory to another false theory closer to C*. 
 
Here (a) and (b) show how the emergence of a new theory can improve our cognitive state. (b) 
allows that sometimes a step from a weak truth to an informative falsity may be progressive, but (e) 
shows that informative truth wins falsities. According to (a) and (c), accumulation of truths is 
progressive. Oddie’s (1986) definition of truthlikeness does not give a plausible account of 
progress, since it fails to satisfy (c). (d) is Popper’s (1963) truth content principle, and (f) is the 
crucial condition that Popper’s own definition failed to satisfy. 
 Definitions (3) and (4) presuppose that theories are assessed relative to the same target 
C*. This is motivated by the idea that the compared theories have to be rival answers to the same 
cognitive problem. If H and H’ are expressed in different languages L and L’, (3) has to be modified 
by translating these theories into a common conceptual framework which an extension of L and L’. 
In the richer framework, one may find continuity between theories H and H’ so that it is possible to 
speak about convergence to the truth. Schurz (2011) shows this with his notion of structural 
correspondence, which links theoretical expressions responsible for the success of a superseded 
theory to some theoretical expressions of the superseding theory.    
Reference invariance in spite of meaning variance and incommensurability can be 
defended also on the basis of appropriate theories of reference. For the realist, whose account of 
scientific progress includes sequences of the type (5e), it is important that e.g. rival theories of 
electrons by Lorentz and Bohr can be construed so that they refer to the same theoretical entity, 
even though both of them gave in some respects mistaken descriptions of its nature. Similarly, the 
transition from Rutherford to Bohr’s and Sommerfeld’s theories of the atom illustrates progress as 
truth approximation (Hettema and Kuipers, 1995). However, Frost-Arnold (2014) has argued that 
the realist has to either accept semantic antirealism or reject common semantic views, since on 
“standards views in philosophy of language” (such as direct reference theory and Fregean 
descriptive theory) reference failures lead to certain sentences being neither true nor false. For 
example, on those accounts, `Caloric is weightless` is truth-valueless or meaningless, so that it does 
not express a proposition at all. But already Russell in 1907 showed how the sentence ‘The present 
king of France is bald’ can be understood as involving a mistaken existence claim, so that it is 
meaningful but false. Kitcher (1993) has argued, by causal and descriptive accounts of reference, 
that at least some tokens of terms like ‘phlogiston’ and ‘dephlogisticated air’ can refer to oxygen, or 
‘ether’ can refer to the electromagnetic field (cf. Psillos, 1999; Ladyman, 2002). While ordinary 
Fregean theory allows a theoretical term to refer only to those entities which the theory describes 
truly, so that a false theory cannot refer to anything, one can combine the descriptive theory of 
reference with a Principle of Charity: a theory refers to those real things which it describes in the 
most truthlike way (see Niiniluoto, 1999a, pp. 128-132). On this account, it is meaningful to state 
that rival false theories refer to the same entity and one of them gives a more truthlike description of 
it.  
   Idealized theories give important illustrations of progressive shifts in science (see 
Nowak, 1980). In these examples, the laws are modified to make them more truthlike. Galileo’s 
study of free fall accepted the deliberate idealization that resistance of air is excluded, so that his 
famous law was known to be false with respect to real motions. Truthlikeness is increased when this 
idealization is first made explicit and then the equations are corrected by “concretization”, i.e. by 
introducing resistance of air as an additional factor into the law. Such corrections can be calculated 
by using Newton’s mechanics which itself turns out to be – in the light of relativity theory and 
quantum theory - an idealization in some respects. Similarly, Boyle – Mariotte law pV = RT for 
ideal gas can be concretized by van der Waals law (p + a/V2)(V - b) = RT, which takes into account 
intermolecular attractive forces a and the finite size b of gas molecules. This equation, derived in 
1873, is a progressive improvement of the ideal gas law, but it has later been corrected in statistical 
thermodynamics. Again we have a case of increasing truthlikeness with reference invariance: 
instead of thinking that Boyle –Mariotte law refers to ideal gas, it can be taken to refer to real gas, 
so that its claim can be compared with van der Waals law. 
Darrell Rowbottom (forthcoming) argues against the definitions (3) and (4) that 
scientific progress is possible in the absence of increasing verisimilitude. He asks us to imagine that 
the scientists in a specific area of physics have found the maximally verisimilar theory C*. Then, by 
the criterion (3), no more progress is possible, but yet this general true theory could be used for 
further predictions and applications. One reply to this argument is that the definition (3) involves 
the idealization that knowing the complete truth C* implies knowing all the deductive consequences 
of C*, so that predictions from C* do not constitute any further progress. But if we give up this 
assumption of “logical omniscience”, then the theory C* can be used for solving genuine cognitive 
problems by deducing new consequences from C*, and the solutions of such problems are 
progressive by the condition (5a).ix Moreover, if we accept conceptual pluralism, in Rowbottom’s 
thought experiment it would still be possible for the physicists to achieve further progress by 
extending their conceptual framework in order so find a still deeper complete truths about their 
research domain.            
Alexander Bird (2007) has advocated an epistemic definition of progress as increase 
of knowledge: even though here knowledge is not defined as justified true belief, it is taken to entail 
truth and justification, so that Bird’s epistemic view in fact returns to the old cumulative model of 
progress. He argues that the semantic definition (accumulation of truths or increasing truthlikeness) 
is not sufficient to define scientific progress, so that the epistemic definition referring to 
justification and knowledge is more adequate. Rowbottom (2008) contends against Bird that 
justification is instrumental rather than constitutive of progress. Mizrahi (2013a) shows that the 
epistemic view is still supported by many practicing scientists, but such interviews hardly can settle 
a normative philosophical issue about progress. 
Bird’s characterization of the “semantic” view includes two alternatives which should 
be distinguished. Since Popper (1963) scientific realists have realized that truth alone cannot the 
aim of science, since this goal could be pursued with a conservative strategy of seeking maximally 
probable – even tautological – hypotheses. As Levi (1967) shows, scientists have to “gamble with 
truth” or risk error in their attempt to find interesting and informative truths. Perhaps accumulation 
of true beliefs could describe the aim of Goldman’s (1999) “veritism”, which is based on his 
reliabilist epistemology, but this is quite different from maximal verisimilitude as the aim of 
science.x       
Bird argues against the semantic view by the following thought experiment. Imagine 
that a scientific community has formed beliefs B by an irrational method M, such as astrology, and 
B happens to be true. M is then shown to be unreliable and the beliefs B are given up. He goes on to 
suggest that for the semantic view, but not for the epistemic view which requires adequate 
justification, the acquisition of accidentally true beliefs by an unreliable method is progress, and the 
rejection of unfounded but true beliefs is regressive. 
The virtue of Bird’s argument is that it reveals the abstract nature of most discussions 
of scientific progress: a condition like (3) treats theories in terms of their semantic content but 
independently of their status among the scientists. A hidden assumption has been that the primary 
application of the notion of scientific progress concerns successive theories which have been 
accepted by the scientific community. Some sort of tentative justification for such theories is 
presupposed even by a radical fallibilist like Popper who is ready to talk about the best-tested 
theories so far as “the scientific knowledge” of the day (Popper, 1979, p. 261). As Lakatos vividly 
showed, sometimes such knowledge-seeking takes place in scientific subcommunities pursuing 
their own “research programmes”, but even there progress requires success in experimental tests. 
Irrational beliefs and beliefs without any justification simply do not belong to the scope of scientific 
progress (Niiniluoto, 2014a). Further, as reminded by Cevolani and Tambolo (2013), the 
verisimilitude approach handles issues about justification by means of the distinction between real 
and estimated progress (see (3) and (4)). By (4), irrational adoption of true beliefs is not 
progressive, and it need not be regressive to give up such beliefs.  
Estimated verisimilitude measures allow also us to handle historical cases of 
anticipation where a good theory is first suggested without sufficient justification and only much 
later is shown to be acceptable (e.g. Aristarchus on heliocentric system, Wegener on continental 
drift). The initial evidence E for a hypothetical theory H may be weak, so that ver(H/E) is low, and 
the theory H is not accepted in science, but then new evidence E’ increases its expected 
verisimilitude and thus gives reasons to claim that H is truthlike and eventually leads to the 
acceptance of H.  
  By the results (5a) and (5c), the verisimilitude account of progress includes Bird’s 
cumulative model as its special case. But the crucial question about Bird’s epistemic approach 
concerns its ability to give an account of historical sequences of false theories (cf. (5f) above). He 
mentions the transitions from Galileo to Newton to Einstein and from Ptolemy to Copernicus to 
Kepler, but today we are aware that these sequences include false theories which cannot be known 
by Bird’s own standards.xi Bird suggests that if H is approximately true then the proposition 
‘approximately H’ or A(H) is fully true. So replace the sequence of false theories H1, …, Hk by the 
sequence A(H1), …, A(Hk) which contains fully true theories adding to the truth provided by their 
predecessors. The most fatal problem with this proposal concerns its difficulty in distinguishing 
progress and regress in science. Suppose that H1, …, Hk is a regressive sequence of theories with 
increasing distances from the truth. By Bird’s argument, even in this case the sequence A(H1), …, 
A(Hk) would consist of true and known statements. But in spite of this cumulative knowledge on 
the level of A-statements, the original sequence is not progressive (see Niiniluoto, 2014a). 
 According to the realist views of scientific progress (such as the cumulative epistemic 
and non-cumulative verisimilitude approaches), science makes progress on the level of theories. 
Those selective realists, who identify the realist commitments of theories in those parts which are 
preserved in theory changes, have a difficulty of explaining how such theoretical progress is 
possible. Most accounts of selective realism have not directly addressed this conceptual question of 
scientific progress – but perhaps their only move is to appeal to the idea of accumulation of such 
selected true parts. The verisimilitude approach has no such problem with stability assumptions, 
since it optimistically allows that all parts of theories may be changed and improved (see Section 4).  
Duhem’s instrumentalist proposal in 1906 was that real progress occurs only slowly 
and constantly on the level of the empirical content of theories (see Duhem, 1954, pp. 38-39). Thus, 
progress means the accumulation of observational statements covered by fluctuating theories.xii The 
same cumulative idea is formulated in some empiricist accounts of reduction, where a new theory 
includes all the true or verified empirical consequences of its predecessor. A similar account of 
progress could be formulated by Bas van Fraassen’s (1989) constructive empiricism, which 
demands that theories are empirically adequate, i.e. all of their observational consequences are true. 
While instrumentalists (like Duhem) deny that theories have truth values, axiological non-realists 
(like van Fraassen and Laudan) or “epistemic instrumentalists” (Stanford, 2006) do not include truth 
among the aims of science.  
More sophisticated accounts of empirical progress admit that empirical success is 
often approximate, and allow that theories have besides positive successes also anomalies and 
failures (see Kuipers, 2000). Variants of such views include Thomas Kuhn’s (1970) account of 
progress by puzzle solving (where puzzles are problems whose solutions are guaranteed by a 
paradigm) and Larry Laudan’s (1977) notion of problem-solving effectiveness (the number of 
solved problems minus the anomalies and generated conceptual problems).   
For Laudan, solving an empirical problem means that a “statement of the problem” is 
deduced from a theory (Laudan, 1977, p. 25). This agrees with Hempel’s DN-model of potential 
explanation which answers questions of the form “Why p?” by deducing p from a theory (with 
initial conditions).  Laudan attempts to distinguish his notion from explanation by noting that 
solutions of empirical problems are often approximate, but this seems to forget that already Hempel 
and Popper analyzed approximate DN-explanations, where a theory entails a statement p’ 
approximating p (see Hempel, 1965, p. 344). Laudan adds that theories also anticipate nature, so 
that they solve predictive problems of the form “p or not p?” by deducing one of these alternatives 
from a theory. Thus, on the whole, Laudan’s measure of the number of solved problems is 
equivalent to what Hempel called the systematic power of a theory. 
Eino Kaila, who coined the term ‘logical empiricism’ in 1926, pointed out in 1939 that 
scientific theories are not just expected to entail a multitude of empirical consequences, but they 
should do this with as few independent postulates as possible. Kaila’s notion of relative simplicity is 
thus the ratio between the systematic power of a theory and its complexity.xiii However, Kaila 
differs from Laudan (and Mach’s positivist principle of economy of thought) by his thesis that 
relative simplicity gives empirical support to a theory. This is, indeed, one of the strategies that a 
scientific realist can use against antirealists like van Fraassen and Laudan: empirical success is a 
fallible indicator of the truth of the theory (see Section 3). 
 Laudan’s notion of problem-solving does not include decision problems, where we 
choose between alternative actions, but it is clear that scientific theories are also pragmatically 
successful as guides of our actions. Applied research, often using the results of basic research, 
formulates rules of action which are then more or less successful in practice. Again one may claim 
that success in practice is an indicator of the truth of a theory, but some philosophers have proposed 
it as a definition of scientific progress. Thus, Nicholas Rescher’s (1977) “methodological 
pragmatism” characterizes progress as “the increased success of applications in problem solving 
and control”. A similar proposal by Heather Douglas (2014) defines progress as “the increased 
capacity to predict, control, manipulate, and intervene in various contexts”. 
Douglas argues that a clear sense of scientific progress can be provided, if we “relinquish” 
the distinction between pure and applied science. However, she does not distinguish between 
science (pure or applied) as knowledge-seeking and technology as (science-based) design of tools 
and artifacts. For a critical realist, this yields a confusion between scientific progress and 
technological progress (see Niiniluoto, 1984, Ch. 12).  
 3. Success without Miracles 
 
Both Kuhn and Laudan admitted that they cannot explain why science is an effective instrument of 
prediction, control, and problem solving.xiv Since the 1950s the most popular alternative among the 
scientific realists (among them Jack Smart, Hilary Putnam, Grower Maxwell, and Richard Boyd) is 
to defend realism as the best hypothesis which explains the practical (empirical and pragmatic) 
success of science. According to the “ultimate argument” (cf. Musgrave, 1988) or “no miracle 
argument for scientific realism” (NMA), the ability of scientific theories to explain surprising 
phenomena and to yield correct empirical predictions and effective rules of action would be a 
“cosmic coincidence” or a “miracle” unless they refer to real things and are true or at least 
approximately true or truthlike (see Psillos 1999).  
 Kuhn guessed that his inability to explain scientific success is related to the difficulty of 
solving the problem of induction, but it is more appropriate to consider here abduction, which 
Peirce introduced as the third mode of reasoning besides deduction and induction (see Niiniluoto, 
1999b). Induction as such cannot reason from empirical evidence to conclusions about theoretical 
entities; this is the task of hypothetical or abductive reasoning from effects to causes, or from 
observational data to hypothetical explanatory theories: 
 
(A) The surprising fact E is observed; 
 But if H were true, E would be a matter of course. 
 Hence, there is reason to suspect that H is true. 
 
(CP 5.189). According to Peirce, against Comte’s positivism, abduction “frequently supposes 
something which it would be impossible for us to observe directly” (CP 2.640). Peirce understood 
that this form of inference is fallible and open to errors. Therefore, he added, in science the 
abductive step is followed by severe observational and empirical tests of the deductive or probable 
consequences the hypothesis (CP 2.634). Thus, a good hypothesis should have both explanatory 
and predictive power (see also Whewell, 1840). It is clear that NMA as a defence of scientific 
realism is an abductive argument (see Niiniluoto 1984, p. 51). 
 Peirce himself analysed abduction in terms of truth-frequencies, but as a method of 
confirmation abduction also has a straightforward Bayesian justification: if theory H entails 
evidence E or makes E more probable, then E confirms H by increasing its epistemic probability. 
Thus, if theory H deductively or inductively explains E, then E confirms H in the sense of positive 
relevance, i.e. P(H/E) > P(H). This result is generally applicable to theories which may include 
explanatory assumptions about unobservable entities. The only way of blocking this reasoning is to 
assume that all theories have a priori the probability zero (see van Fraassen, 1989), but this amounts 
to a dogmatic scepticism about theories. Moreover, cases of sharp hypotheses where the assumption 
P(H) = 0 is legitimate, can be handled by the tools of approximate truth and truthlikeness. 
 The notion of confirmation is still weak in the sense that the same evidence may confirm 
several conflicting hypotheses. In such cases of underdetermination, it may be reasonable to 
suspend judgment for a while and search for more detailed evidence by new observations, 
experiments, and instruments. Stronger forms of abduction interpret Peirce’s schema (A) as a rule 
of acceptance or inference to the best explanation:  
(IBE)  Hypothesis H may be inferred from evidence E, if H is a better explanation of E than 
any other rival explanation. 
If a critical realist proposes IBE is as an explication of what Laudan (1984) called the “upward 
path” from empirical success to approximate truth, it is important to study the reformulation of 
abductive inference (A) where its conclusion concerns the truthlikeness of a hypothetical theory on 
the basis of its success in explanation and prediction (see Kuipers 2000; Niiniluoto 2004, 2011). For 
example, the success of Newton’s theory in engineering applications is due to the truthlikeness of 
its axioms. Thus, inference to the best theory can be formulated by the rule: 
(IBT)  If theory H is the best explanation of evidence E, conclude for the time being that H 
is truthlike. 
The strength of IBT can be assessed by the function ver, which gives a fallible indicator or link 
between the empirical success of a theory and its estimated truthlikeness  It is reasonable to require 
that an acceptable hypothesis is “sufficiently good” (Lipton, 2004). Minimally, this means that the 
best hypothesis in IBT should be more truthlike than a tautology (i.e. better than ignorance).  
 In a general form the no miracle argument looks like the following: 
(NMA) Many theories in science are empirically successful. 
The truth or truthlikeness of scientific theories is the best explanation of their 
empirical success. 
  Hence, conclude that such successful theories are truthlike. 
The first premise about the success of science is accepted both by realist and antirealists, even 
though in particular cases the attribution of success to a specific theory may be non-trivial. As a 
whole, the argument NMA involves something like the principle IBT, and the conclusion supports 
the position of critical scientific realism. The no miracle argument as a reply to Laudan’s challenge 
presupposes a minimal realist framework where it makes sense to assign truth values to scientific 
statements (including theoretical postulates and laws). Besides semantic realists, this framework is 
accepted by such methodological and epistemological antirealists who think that the truth of 
theories is an irrelevant (van Fraassen, 1989) or “utopian” aim (Laudan, 1984) which “exceeds our 
grasp” (Stanford, 2006). If successful, the no miracle argument is also relevant to those semantic 
antirealists and instrumentalists whose inclination to treat theories as schemata without truth values 
is motivated by their belief about the inaccessibility of theoretical truth. 
 Kuipers notes that the premise of IBT, unlike its conclusion, is comparative between rival 
theories. Therefore, one may formulate weaker comparative versions of these inferences: 
(IBTc)  If H’ is a better explanation of evidence E than H, conclude that H’ is more truthlike 
than H.  
(NMAc) Theory H’ is empirically more successful than its rival H. 
That H’ is more successful than H can be explained by the assumption that H’ is more 
truthlike than H. 
  Hence, conclude that H’ is more truthlike than H. 
For example, on the whole the special theory of relativity is able to explain several phenomena 
more accurately than classical mechanics, so that by IBTc it is more truthlike than Newton’s theory. 
A comparative rule like IBTc is cautious in the sense that in seeking the most truthlike of the 
available hypotheses it avoids van Fraassen’s (1989) problem of a “bad lot”.xv   
 The crucial second premise of NMA needs a reply to Laudan’s challenge of showing that 
there is a “downward path” from approximate truth to empirical success. For true theories, scientific 
realists have an easy answer: if a theory is true, then all of its deductive empirical consequences (if 
any) are true as well. For truthlike theories, the matter is more complicated, but still closeness to 
theoretical truth is sufficient to guarantee at least approximate, average, and probable empirical and 
pragmatic success (see Niiniluoto, 1984, pp. 179-183; Kuipers, 2014). Further, attempts to give 
antirealist explanations of the success of science on the basis of pragmatism or constructive 
empiricism have failed. For example, Arthur Fine (1986) has argued that in the explanatory schema 
“theory H is empirically successful, because H is truthlike” an instrumentalist or anti-realist can 
replace the realist notion of truth by the pragmatist notion of truth. But, as the pragmatist defines 
truth as pragmatic success, Fine’s suggestion would turn this schema into a non-explanatory 
tautology “theory H is pragmatically successful, because H is pragmatically successful”. Similarly, 
if truth is replaced by van Fraassen’s notion of empirical adequacy (see Lyons, 2003), the schema 
“theory H is pragmatically successful, because H is empirically adequate” again fails to be 
explanatory, since it would “explain” the truth of some of the empirical consequences of H by the 
truth of all such consequences. 
 Laudan (1984) and van Fraassen (1989) have also suggested that no explanation of the 
success of scientific theories is needed, since theories are selected for survival by their success. This 
evolutionary move is not convincing, either, since it fails to point out any characteristic permanent 
feature of our best theories (such as their truthlike correspondence to reality) which accounts for 
their ability to yield successful explanations and predictions. It is a different matter to describe the 
selection processes which gives us empirically successful theories and to explain why such theories 
are (and continue to be) successful. Hence, it seems that realism is the best and the only explanation 
of such empirical success (see Niiniluoto, 1999a, pp. 197-199; Psillos, 1999).xvi   
 
4. Pessimism and Optimism about Scientific Progress 
       
Kuhn stated that he is a “convinced believer in scientific progress” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 206), but the 
key premise was his own antirealist puzzle-solving account of progress. Antirealists turn into 
pessimists if they try to analyze progress in realistic terms. A famous “metainduction” was 
formulated by Putnam (1978), p. 25: “just as no term used in the science of more than fifty (or 
whatever years) ago referred, so it will turn out that no term used now refers”. In his “confutation of 
convergent realism”, Laudan (1984) used this pessimistic metainduction (PI) to infer from the 
premise that many theories in the history of science (e.g. ether and caloric theories) have been non-
referring and false but yet to some extent empirically successful to the conclusion that this is the 
fate of our current and future theories as well. One may question, whether this historical argument 
satisfies the conditions for a valid or reliable induction. But many philosophers have shared 
Laudan’s pessimism, in most cases against formulations of Psillos (1999), by giving historical 
examples of past theories which had some empirical success, including novel successes in relation 
to their predecessors, but still are non-referring and false by present lights. The realists have 
developed several selective responses to PI which e.g. restrict realist claims to mature theories, to 
theories enjoying novel predictive success, or those theoretical parts which feature in an essential 
way in the derivation of novel predictions (see Ladyman, 2002). Chakravartty (2007), p. 47, argues 
on the basis of his semirealism that realists can assert “an optimistic induction on the parts of 
theories to which they commit, to the extent that these parts tend to survive over time”. But, against 
the claims of such “preservative” or “localized” realism, it has been argued that such successes may 
have been based upon theoretical postulates that are discredited today (see Chang 2003; Elsamahi 
2005; Lyons 2006; Stanford 2006). 
 Our discussion above has already outlined the most promising realist approaches to the 
pessimistic metainduction. Instead of emphasizing those stable parts of theories which survive over 
time, our picture of theory-change is dynamic in the sense that all parts of current theories may be 
improved by increasing their truthlikeness. In Section 2, we have seen that rival successive theories 
can be treated as referring to the same theoretical entities so that it makes sense to compare their 
degrees of truthlikeness. No epistemic scepticism can defeat the possibility of such real progress in 
science, but we have also grounds for claiming that science has been and will be progressive. 
Instead of using single theories in Laudan’s list as instances of a metainduction, one should consider 
pairs of theories as such instances. For example, phlogiston theory was more truthlike than its 
predecessors, which treated fire as a substance rather than as a process, and it was superseded by a 
more truthlike oxygen theory (see Niiniluoto, 1999a, pp. 191-192; Schurz, 2011), and similarly old 
quantum theory was more successful than classical mechanics (see Kuipers, 2000, pp. 278-288). 
Doppelt (2014) has given an overoptimistic interpretation that the rejection of past theories 
presupposes that our best current theories are true (so that (5d) would be the typical theory 
sequence). A critical realist may instead grant that future theories are false, since sequences of type 
(5f) are common in the history of science. However, without simply concluding that future theories 
are false, the realist can argue that in typical cases the successor theory is more truthlike than its 
predecessor. The fact that such theories have been replaced by better theories is not a “Pyrrhic 
victory” for scientific realism (see Stanford 2006), since it supports the realist picture of scientific 
progress as increasing truthlikeness. Indeed, every instance of the original PI supports the 
progressive nature of science. 
 Evidence for such a comparative and dynamic picture of successful science comes not only 
from an optimistic historical induction from past science, but also from the fact that scientists by 
their method favour empirically successful theories and the increasing success of such theories is 
best explained by their increasing truthlikeness. Thus, Theo Kuipers (2009) suggests on the basis of 
NMAc that “comparative realism is the best answer to antirealism”. Also Moti Mizrahi (2013b) 
defends “relative realism” by assuming that the assessment of theoretical hypotheses is always 
comparative (but without appealing to NMA).xvii David Harker (2013) too argues that an important 
victory over many forms of antirealism is obtained by showing that lineages of theories are 
becoming more truthlike rather than claiming that they are approximately true. Harker’s version of 
selective realism restricts the realist attitude to those parts of theories that generate comparative 
progress and predicts that such parts are retained in the development of science.  
 PI has been interpreted as refuting the explanatory connection between truthlikess and 
empirical success. In Section 3, we have defended this connection and argued instead that even the 
modest success of some theories (such as phlogiston theory) has to be explained by the fact that 
parts of these theories were close to the truth – and no alternative explanation is available.    
 Comparative realism is epistemically cautious, as it admits that we never know for sure how 
close to the truth we have progressed. It agrees with Popper’s strong fallibilism that “while we 
cannot ever have sufficiently good arguments in the empirical sciences for claiming that we have 
actually reached the truth, we can have strong and reasonably good arguments for claiming that we 
may have made progress toward the truth” (Popper, 1979, pp. 57-58).  It need not disagree with 
Kyle Stanford’s (2006) predicament that recurrently the scientists have failed to exhaust all the 
possible hypotheses. But the potential existence of “unconceived alternatives”, which may be 
equally well supported as our currently best one, need not lead to a theoretical scepticism about 
atoms, genes, gravitational fields, and the past ancestors of our species (ibid., p. 210). On the 
contrary, the realist need not believe that our current descriptions of theoretical entities are final and 
literally true, but progress can still be made with the advance of theories and evidence for them. In 
this sense, the fact that truth has not yet been found gives hope for optimism: perhaps still better and 
deeper theories can be reached when we move to new and richer conceptual frameworks.  
Stronger form of realism appeal to the original non-comparative form of IBE or NMA 
to conclude that our best theories are in fact in the proximity of truth – at least so close that it is 
rational to tentatively accept them in our evolving body of scientific knowledge and to use them as 
a basis of practical action. But even such forms of realism leave room for further progress.  
An old story relates that, when seeing that a glass is partly filled with water, an 
optimist states that it is half full and a pessimist that it is half empty. Scientific realists and 
antirealists see the same facts about the historical development and practices of science, but give 
conflicting  – optimistic and pessimistic - interpretations of them. In this paper, I have tried to 
summarize some reasons for an optimistic realism.   
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i Aronson, Harré and Way (1994) operate with a weaker notion of approximate truth which has a maximal value if T is 
true, i.e. T is entailed by C*.  
ii For an alternative approach to epistemic truthlikeness, see Kuipers (2000). 
iii This objective notion of truth distinguishes critical realism from Ron Giere’s (2006) recent formulation of perspectival 
realism, which allows only a theory-relative notion “according to this highly confirmed theory (or reliable instrument), 
the world seems to be roughly such and such”.  
iv One way of achieving this aim would be to find a categorical theory which is able to determine the structure of the 
world up to isomorphism. This task is very ambitious, since no first-order theory is categorical. It is also known that 
quantum field theory in thermodynamic limit (with infinite number of degrees of freedom) has non-isomorphic 
models (Ruetsche, 2011).     
v For references, see the bibliographical survey in Niiniluoto (2012). 
vi For examples, see Horowicz and Janis (1994). Blondlot’s non-existent N-rays gives also an example of scientific 
regress (see Bird, 2008; Rowbottom, 2008). 
vii If we assume with metaphysical realism that the world has a definite structure, which can be described in a 
Peirceish framework P, then progress can be defined by truthlikeness relative to such framework P. In particular, if the 
ultimate goal is to know the unique structure of the world, as ontic structural realists think, then the appropriate 
measure of progress can be given by partial isomorphisms (see da Costa and French, 2002, for an account of partial 
truth).     
viii Rowbottom (forthcoming) argues that increasing theoretical verisimilitude is not the central dimension of scientific 
progress, since achieving predictive power and understanding could be taken to be the primary goals of science. I 
agree that predictive power and understanding are important, but they can be maximized by maximizing 
verisimilitude, but not necessarily vice versa. 
ix This is what Kuhn (1970) called “puzzle-solving”. 
x  For a reliabilist, theories are justified with epistemic processes which have a high truth-frequency in producing true 
results.  
xi The classical notion of knowledge, which presupposes truth and justification, cannot cover false theories (e.g. 
Newton’s mechanics). For a modified notion of conjectural knowledge, where truth is replaced by truthlikeness, see 
Niiniluoto (1999a), p. 84. Progress with respects to such conjectural knowledge is not cumulative. 
xii Duhem added to his instrumentalism the claim that physical theory makes progress by becoming “more and more 
similar to a natural classification which is its ideal end” (Duhem, 1954, p. 298). One may wonder whether such a 
peculiar form of convergent realism makes sense without assuming that the classified laws refer to real theoretical 
entities.   
xiii For a translation of Kaila’s work, published originally in Finnish and Swedish in 1939, see Kaila (2014).  
xiv See Kuhn (1978), pp. 332-333, Laudan (1977), p. 224.  
                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                                                
xv Van Fraassen argues that the true hypothesis is missed if it is not included among the considered rivals. But one can 
always operate with a partition of mutually exclusive and logically exhaustive hypotheses so that their set must 
contain a true one. If the best one turns out to be the catch-all hypothesis (in the simplest case, the negation ¬H of H), 
we have reason to find a richer set of hypotheses.     
xvi Mizrahi (2012) argues that Kukla’s (1998) ”weak surrealism” (i.e. the observable world behaves as if our mature 
theories are true) and realism (i.e. our mature theories are true) are equally plausible as explanations for the success 
of science, since they yield the same independently testable predictions. However, weak surrealism only describes the 
fact about science which is in need of explanation.   
xvii This is not quite convincing. The best justification of induction is not only comparative, but shows that the inductive 
probability of the strongest hypothesis approaches one with increasing evidence. A similar result holds in special cases 
also for the convergence of the estimated verisimilitude (see Niiniluoto, 2007).   
